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deductions for 1967. However, estimated itemized deductions may not exceed the deductions actually itemized in 1966, and the individual's estimate of wage income cannot be less than the wage income he received in 1966. For each \$700 of estimated itemized deductions in excess of 10 percent of \$7,500 of estimated wage income, plus 17 percent of wages above \$7,500, an individual may claim one additional withholding allowance.

An example will serve to illustrate. In 1966 an individual has a salary of \$8,500 and claimed itemized deductions totaling \$1,700. He expects to have similar salary and deduction in 1967. The excess of \$1,700—total deductions—over \$920—10 percent of \$7,500 plus 17 percent of \$1,000—is \$780. Since this is at least \$700 but not \$1,400, he may claim one additional withholding allowance for 1967. Had his itemized deductions in 1966—and his estimated deductions for 1967—been \$2,320, he could claim two additional withholding allowances.

Any individual wishing to claim additional withholding allowances under these provisions should file another W-4 form with his employer, filling in the necessary information in schedule A of this form. In order to avoid overwithholding, taxpayers should avail themselves of this opportunity at an early date.

LAW APPRECIATION WEEK PROPOSED BY WICHITA, KANS., TOWN CLUB BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL WOMEN

(Mr. SHRIVER (at the request of Mr. MIZE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Speaker, the ever-increasing crime rate across the Nation is causing concern among many local, State and national organizations as well as private citizens.

Significantly, the President took note of this concern in his state of the Union message last week. The Congress has supported and enacted legislation to assist local and State authorities in the war on crime. We should give serious consideration to new anticrime measures which will be introduced in the 90th Congress.

However, I agree with President Johnson that this is not a war which Washington alone can win. We must begin at the local level. Local citizens and organizations can assume important roles in supporting their law enforcement agencies.

For example, the Town Club Business & Professional Women of Wichita, Kans., has informed me of a resolution passed by its membership recommending "an educational program to teach the younger generation the importance of law enforcement agencies and the proper respect and attitudes toward them." The resolution also recommends that a week be set aside each year to "express our appreciation to our law enforcement agencies."

Mr. Speaker, the action of the Town Club & Professional Women appears to me to be a step in the right direction. It is worthy of our commendation and con-

sideration as we weigh proposals in this Congress aimed at the problem of crime. Following is the text of the resolution:

In accordance with the resolution passed by Zonta Club of Wichita, Kansas, Town Club Business and Professional Women's Club of Wichita, Kansas, passed the following resolution on November 1, 1966:

Whereas we fear for the safety of our government and our way of life if the prevalent disrespect and disregard for law and order presently displayed in recent demonstrations of all kinds persists, and

Whereas we do not approve of the lack of public respect for officers acting in the line of duty, and

Whereas we feel that there is national concern as well as local concern, that a breakdown in our law enforcement agencies will be the inevitable result if the public as a whole does not speak out and support them, and

Whereas we believe that our entire police organizations should be censured because of a few incidents which do not represent the true purpose nor actions of our law enforcement agencies, and

Whereas we are proud of our local police department and by this action are expressing our complete support,

Therefore be it resolved: That Town Club Business and Professional Women's Club of Wichita, Kansas does fully support our police department, sheriff's department and all other law enforcement agencies.

That we recommend to the parents and to the schools that they promote an educational program to teach the younger generation the importance of our law enforcement agencies and the proper respect and attitudes toward them.

That a week be set aside each year to express our appreciation to our law enforcement agencies.

RUBY E. DUTTON,
President, Town Club Business & Professional Women's Club.

POLL ON VIETNAMESE CONFLICT BY RESPONSIBLE TEENAGERS

(Mr. LUKENS (at the request of Mr. MIZE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. LUKENS. Mr. Speaker, the students at Lakeland High School in Rathdrum, Idaho, have gone a long way toward dispelling the image of today's teenager as irresponsible.

A recent poll on the Vietnamese conflict, taken in the school's social studies classes, illustrates beyond a doubt that the students are concerned citizens. It is regrettable that a number of those polled are likely to serve with the military in southeast Asia someday. And yet, the responses to the questions seem to have been motivated by concern for the country's welfare rather than concern for self.

To School Principal Richard Snook and Social Studies Department Chairman Dennis F. Carey, my congratulations for the fine job they are doing at Lakeland High. But most of all, I compliment the students themselves for taking an active interest in national problems.

I would like to think that prodding from responsible students throughout the country would pave the in-depth study of Vietnam by the Congress.

The poll follows:

STUDENT VIETNAM POLICY OPINION POLL

(1) Some distinguished commentators have said that Congress has been at fault in not

having a full scale debate on the Administration's policies in Viet Nam. Do you agree or disagree? Agree 154, disagree 93.

(2) If a peace conference in Viet Nam provided for free elections that could result in Communists being part of the Vietnamese government, would you favor such an arrangement or not? Would 40, would not 210.

(3) If our opponents in Viet Nam refuse to negotiate, what should be the U.S. policy?

(a) Withdraw all military forces, 5.

(b) Continue to build up armed forces indefinitely, 39.

(c) Maintain our current strength as a holding force, 38.

(d) Hold our forces at the same level and accelerate bombing of civilian targets in the north, 50.

(e) Increase our ground forces and accelerate bombing of civilian targets in north, 93.

(f) Refer the whole matter to the United Nations for a decision, 22.

(4) Do you agree or disagree that it was wise to change the role of the U.S. military in Viet Nam from advisors to the Viet army to greatly increased participation in the actual fighting? Agree 178, disagree 70.

(5) Newspaper reports from Viet Nam sometimes differ sharply from official government reports. When they differ, which do you think is nearer the truth? The government 87, the newspapers 57, neither 98.

(6) The U.S. Constitution states that Congress has the power to declare war. The Viet Nam war has not been so declared. Do you think that the President should recommend such a formal declaration? Yes 81, no 164 (yes or no.)

(7) Do you approve or disapprove of reclassifying the draft status of students to immediate induction if they protest publicly against the administration's policy in Viet Nam? Approve 113, disapprove 133.

(8) Is President Johnson doing a good job as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces? Yes 113, no 103. Republican 57, Democrat 81, independent 106.

ADDITIONAL JUDGE FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

(Mr. BOB WILSON (at the request of Mr. MIZE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing legislation to provide for the appointment of an additional judge for the southern district of California.

The district is comprised of San Diego and Imperial Counties. Two full-time judges, assisted on a part-time basis by a retired district judge, now serve the district. But their task would indeed discourage most men.

For many years these three jurists have had to handle a caseload almost as large as that handled by 13 judges in the central district about Los Angeles. As a result, a huge backlog of cases has developed, and many litigants will have to wait months, perhaps even years, before their cases can be decided. As of June 1966, there were 499 criminal cases and 247 civil cases waiting to be heard in the district.

As San Diego and Imperial Counties continue to grow, the situation will become even worse. An additional judge, which my bill would provide, is desperately needed to begin work on this backlog of cases so that the southern district

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will be able to operate at an efficient level.

For many years the Los Angeles Federal court system handled more criminal cases each year than San Diego's. In 1964 the situation changed. That year 1,402 criminal cases were filed in San Diego, compared to 1,034 in Los Angeles. In 1965 there were 2,070 criminal cases commenced in San Diego and only 1,212 started in Los Angeles.

San Diego's extraordinary caseload results from a combination of factors. One is the city's proximity to the Mexican border which generates numerous immigration and narcotics cases each year. Other factors include the huge concentration of military installations in San Diego, increasing foreign commerce through the port of San Diego, and the area's rapid growth in population and industrial and agricultural development.

The San Diego County Bar Association, which endorses the bill, recently made an in-depth study of the southern district's caseload. Here are some of its findings:

Total cases filed increased from 975 in 1960 to 2,299 in 1965—a 140 per cent rise in five years. Total cases tried were 177 in 1965, a 101 per cent increase over the 88 trials in 1960.

While civil cases pending increased by 23.2 per cent from 1962 to 1965, criminal cases more than tripled. The requirements of due process make it mandatory that criminal cases be disposed of as expeditiously as possible even, if necessary, at the expense of the civil calendar.

In 1964 over the country at large the average trial days per judge were 73, while in the combined Southern and Central Districts the average was 91 trial days per judge.

Thus the 321 trial days in San Diego would justify four full-time judges based on the figures for the nation as a whole.

Actually we must consider more than just "trial days" in measuring the workload of a district judge. He must also spend time hearing motions, reviewing bankruptcy matters, holding naturalization hearings and impaneling juries.

In view of the above facts, Mr. Speaker, I respectfully urge the Congress to give prompt consideration of the critical need for one additional judgeship in San Diego's Federal court system, which is so weighted down by cases, its wheels of justice are barely turning.

ADMINISTRATION'S EAST/WEST TRADE PROPOSALS MUST BE STUDIED BY CONGRESS

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. LIPSCOMB asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, the President's state of the Union message emphasized once again the administration's heavy commitment to increasing trade with Communist countries.

As the President pointed out in the message, the administration has removed more than 400 so-called nonstrategic items from export control; it has determined that the Export-Import Bank can allow commercial credits to Poland, Hun-

gary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Rumania and Yugoslavia; and the President urged the Congress to pass an East-West trade bill.

This is a course of action that I believe is detrimental to the welfare of the United States. Far-reaching and significant proposals are involved. It is for this reason that I feel it necessary to bring this matter to the attention of the House of Representatives at this time, at the opening of the 90th Congress. This is a subject that requires constant, close appraisal and study and action by the Congress in the national interest. That is why I have introduced a resolution, House Resolution 67, to establish a House Select Committee on Export Control.

The steps enumerated by President Johnson, in his state of the Union speech, include agreements, actions, and determinations which he had first publicly announced in a speech of October 7, 1966. In that speech he also said the Export-Import Bank would finance American exports of automotive manufacturing machinery to equip a huge automotive plant that the Fiat Co. of Italy is going to build in the U.S.S.R.

When the President made his announcement on October 7, he and every responsible official in the administration knew that the Soviet Union and other Communist countries of Eastern Europe were continuing to supply military and economic aid to the Communists with whom we and allies are at war in southeast Asia.

The administration has clamped a tight lid on information showing just how much and what type of aid is being sent to Hanoi by the Communist bloc. However, on the basis of information and commentaries available from various sources, it is obvious that the Communists are sending shipload after shipload and carload after carload and plane-load after plane-load of supplies and equipment to North Vietnam.

In a letter addressed to the President dated October 13, 1966, I posed the following question:

When you speak to the relatives of Americans who have been killed or maimed by weapons, equipment, and ammunition which was supplied by the Communists to whom we export our products and technology, how do you explain the Administration's trade-with-Communists policy?

My letter was not answered by the White House but instead was sent over to the Department of State. The response from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations was a carefully phrased rehashing of earlier pronouncements on the subject, on about how this involves a so-called peaceful venture, that this is supposed to transcend differences we might have in Vietnam, and that we seek mutual understanding and constructive agreements.

This all sounds noble, but for an idea as to how it is working let me quote from an article in the December 27, 1966, issue of Izvestiya, the official Soviet Government newspaper. The article states, in part:

Every month tens of thousands of tons of technical equipment and food are shipped from Black Sea and Far East Soviet ports to the DRV. Ship communication between our

countries has become regular, with the Soviet maritime fleet following a line service schedule. These vessels carry mineral fertilizers and rolled ferrous metal, automobiles and tractors, cables and paper, medical equipment and canned goods, flour, and oil, part of the aid rendered by the Soviet people to fraternal Vietnam in its heroic struggle against the U.S. militarists.

A UPI news report out of Moscow January 12, 1967, 2 days after the state of the Union message, states:

Russia has indicated it will increase aid shipments to Communist North Vietnam this year to help Hanoi fight "American imperialism."

Foreign Aid Minister Nikolai Patolichev told Soviet newspapers Wednesday that Moscow "intends to give special attention to the development of trade" with Hanoi in 1967.

"The deliveries of Soviet goods to this heroic country is part of the great contribution which our people are making to the just struggle of the fraternal Vietnamese people against the aggression of American imperialism," he said.

Although Patolichev made no predictions of the amount of aid for 1967, he did note that Soviet exports to North Vietnam last year jumped 50%.

The increase in Russia's exports last year included greater supplies of gasoline, diesel oil and grease—necessary for the shipment of goods from China into Vietnam—and portable power plants which could be thrown into action when major generating stations were hit by American bombs.

Certainly this does not represent the position of a government genuinely interested in seeking mutual understanding with the United States. And, of course, in addition to the mineral fertilizers, rolled steel, trucks and tractors, cable and paper, medical preparations, canned food, flour, gasoline, diesel oil, grease, and powerplants mentioned in the articles, everyone knows about the Mig-21 aircraft, the surface-to-air missiles, the antiaircraft guns, the radars, the computers, and the many other implements of war being supplied to Hanoi by the Communist community of Socialist nations.

Another administration declaration on this subject was supplied on October 11, 1966, at Syracuse, N.Y., by Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Trade Policy and Economic Defense. Here is what Mr. Greenwald said on October 11:

The obvious question is: Why should we trade with any of the Communist nations when they are supporting the forces shooting at Americans, South Vietnamese, Australians and others? President Johnson answered on Friday. Speaking of the need to work with the East to build a lasting peace, he said: "We do not intend to let our differences on Viet-Nam or elsewhere prevent us from exploring all opportunities."

Another answer to this question lies in the nature of the Communist world as we see it today. What we once knew as the Sino-Soviet bloc is no longer the monolith of Stalin's time. We know that today there are deep and bitter differences among these countries. It is no longer axiomatic that Moscow's word will be followed blindly by all of the faithful followers throughout the world. On the contrary, we find daily evidence that each of the Communist countries increasingly pursues its own national interests. It is to our advantage in this situation to deal with these countries in accordance with our own national interests—and not in accordance with an outdated concept of a Sino-Soviet bloc of a decade ago.

Finally, we do not ignore the commercial benefits from expanding trade.

From this we see that the Department puts fourth roughly a three-part argument that might be described as follows:

First. Ignore the differences we have with the U.S.S.R. and East European Communists over Communist aggression in Vietnam;

Second. Dollar profits from sales to Communists are at least as important as lives lost;

Third. Look for evidence of differences between East-European Communists and the Soviet Communists.

The first and second parts of that position are incredible. As for the claim that the Communist nations are going their separate ways and that there are deep and bitter differences between them, here as a few quotes by spokesmen for bloc countries which shows that this is specious, hollow argument. When the chips are down the Communists think and act as one in advancing the Communist cause. Bear in mind that these statements were made after the President's October 7, 1966, announcement.

Communist Party Leader Brezhnev speaking on the Sofia, Bulgaria, domestic radio November 15, 1966:

The all-around aid being rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to fighting Vietnam is of concrete effective nature, and let everyone know that it will continue. . . . The Bulgarian People's Republic, just as other socialist states, is rendering the people of Vietnam fraternal aid in their struggle against the imperialist aggressor.

Hungarian Premier Kallai speaking on the Budapest Hungarian domestic radio November 30, 1966:

The U.S. administration has recently emphasized on several occasions that it desires to improve its relations with the socialist countries in Europe. The American administration knows very well, however, that it will be unable to normalize relations with the European socialist countries as long as it is conducting aggression against a socialist country in Southeast Asia.

Janos Kadar, ruler of Hungary, on Budapest Domestic Radio in Hungarian language, December 3, 1966:

We are fighting against U.S. aggression in Vietnam and will go on helping our Vietnamese brothers until their cause is crowned by ultimate victory.

Prague, Czechoslovakia, radio, December 4, 1966:

The entire socialist world has joined forces to provide Vietnam with all conceivable assistance—economic, financial, and technical, as well as political, including the Soviet offer to allow volunteers from Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries to go to Vietnam.

Andrey Kirilenko, member of the Communist Party Central Committee of the Soviet Union, on Moscow radio December 1, 1966:

The Soviet Union is rendering and will continue to render ever-growing, all-around assistance to the people of Vietnam in their courageous struggle against U.S. aggression.

Bulgarian Premier Zhivkov, Sofia Bulgarian radio on December 1, 1966:

All peace-loving and progressive forces in the world should support the Vietnamese people. Because of this the Bulgarian Gov-

ernment has extended and will continue to extend moral-political support and material aid to the Vietnamese people to bolster their economic and defense capability.

These declarations underscore the fact that if you look for evidence of meaningful differences among the East European Communists, you look in vain.

In spite of everything that Communist leaders have told us, in spite of all of the evidence, administration spokesmen apparently are proud of what they wishfully hope to accomplish. Poland is always cited as a good example by the administration. Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, on October 21, 1965, said this about Poland:

We encouraged the trend toward greater independence through our Food for Peace program, our Export-Import Bank credits, and our trade policy.

Even as these words were spoken, Polish ships made their way to southeast Asia. A dispatch last fall from Stettin, Poland, reported in a Hamburg newspaper, October 1, 1966, states:

Weapons of the Polish armed forces are being shipped from the Stettin harbor in ever increasing quantities to . . . North Vietnamese harbors. . . . While on one side of the Stettin harbor American wheat is being unloaded from freighters, on the other side of the same harbor weapons are loaded which are being used against American soldiers.

And Polish ships today continue to supply our enemies in Vietnam.

Communist nations come to America with shopping lists to purchase technical data and commodities which incorporate advanced technology. Under the provisions of the Export Control Act many such items have been placed on a control list because it was determined that their export, to quote from the law, "makes a significant contribution to the military or economic potential of such nation or nations which would prove detrimental to the national security and welfare of the United States."

Before an item is removed from the control list it is only reasonable to expect that the administration would undertake a thorough research to determine that the item no longer does make a significant contribution to the military or economic potential of the Communists. And since this Nation is at war with Communists in Vietnam who are receiving military and economic aid from the Communists of Eastern Europe, it would seem not only prudent but mandatory that our military intelligence experts be consulted before an item could be removed safely from export controls. The chiefs of the military intelligence organizations are members of the intelligence community.

Following President Johnson's announcement, the Department of Commerce on October 12, 1966, removed hundreds of commodities from the list of items requiring specific validated licenses to be shipped to other countries. The Department published a 68-page bulletin which provides a detailed listing of the items which now may be more freely exported including the 400 items referred to by the President in the state of the Union message that can be freely ex-

ported to the Soviet Union and East European Communist countries.

And the Department of Commerce at that time issued a press release declaring to the American people that the items removed from the control list "fall into the category of peaceful goods, which may be freely exported without any risk to the United States national interests."

Also, the Department of Commerce asserted that the Department had "consulted with other interested departments, including Defense, State, Agriculture, Interior, and the Intelligence Community, in taking this step."

Something immediately seemed wrong, for though press references concerning the action seemed to stress only that decontrols on cereals and other food preparations were involved, it was obvious from a mere glance at the 68-page bulletin that many vitally important items were listed, including such items as diesel engines, jet aircraft engines, machine tools, rifle cleaning compounds and other chemicals, and scientific and controlling instruments.

This raised the question: Could the Intelligence Community really have been consulted before these items were removed from export controls, particularly those who should be most concerned, the military intelligence agencies?

I therefore by letter requested each of the chiefs of the military intelligence organizations to describe whether the Department of Commerce had consulted with his organization and to describe such consultations.

Each of the replies state that the administration did not consult with our military intelligence experts.

The Director of Naval Intelligence states:

The Office of Naval Intelligence, definitely a member of the "Intelligence Community," had no part in the consultations which preceded the revision of the Commodity Control List.

The Air Force says:

No intelligence office of the U.S. Air Force participated in the revision of the Current Commodity Control List.

The Army says that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army, "was not consulted regarding the commodities listed."

The Department of Defense says that the Defense Intelligence Agency "was not requested to supply intelligence on the 400 commodities that are covered in Current Export Control Bulletin No. 941."

For the information of the House, I am setting forth here the full text of the letters from the chiefs of the service intelligence organizations and from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C., October 26, 1966.

HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB,
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. LIPSCOMB: The interim reply from my Deputy, to your letter of 18 October 1966, concerning Current Export Bulletin Number 941 indicated that my Staff would research the matter in which you have expressed an interest.

I can report that the Office of Naval Intelligence, definitely a member of the "Intelligence Community," had no part in the consultations which preceded the revision of the Commodity Control List. It can be further stated that ONI did not give its authorization for the removal of specific licensing requirements for the categories of commodities listed in Bulletin Number 941.

I trust that this information satisfactorily answers your questions with respect to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Sincerely yours,

E. B. FLUCKEY,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE,
Washington, D.C., October 28, 1966.

Hon. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. LIPSCOMB: Thank you for your letter of 18 October 1966, and your inquiry into the recent revision of the Commodity Control List.

In response to your specific questions, I take this opportunity to inform you that no intelligence office of the United States Air Force participated in the revision of the Current Commodity Control List. I have no evidence to indicate that any other United States Air Force agencies participated in this revision.

Sincerely,

JACK E. THOMAS,
Major General, USAF,
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D.C., October 25, 1966.

Hon. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. LIPSCOMB: This is in response to your inquiry addressed to Major General John J. Davis pertaining to the Department of Commerce Current Export Bulletin Number 941 and interest of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Army (ACSI-DA), in selection of commodities approved for export to Communist Bloc countries.

The ACSI-DA was not consulted regarding the commodities listed, since the scope of interest does not include the intelligence aspects of strategic materials.

I regret I am not able to assist you in this matter.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND T. REID,
LTC, GS.
For J. L. BLACKWELL,
Colonel, GS, Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison.

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., October 27, 1966.
Hon. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. LIPSCOMB: This letter is in response to your letter to General Carroll, dated October 18, 1966, which requests a description of the consultations of the Department of Commerce with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concerning Current Export Bulletin Number 941.

DIA does not participate in decisions on commodities to be deleted from or added to the Commodity Control List issued by the Department of Commerce. Intelligence concerning such items is provided by DIA, but not directly to the Department of Commerce.

Upon request of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs which represents the Department of Defense on these matters, DIA provides intelligence on the military application of commodities that might be of a

strategic nature. However, DIA was not requested to supply intelligence on the 400 commodities that are covered in Current Export Bulletin Number 941.

Sincerely,

C. R. RODERICK,
Major General, USAF,
Director, Office of Legislative Liaison.

From these responses there seems no other conclusions but that the Commerce Department did not consult important elements of the intelligence community and that it misled the public in implying that the entire intelligence community concurred in the action of the Department in removing hundreds of items from the control list.

The failure to consult the military intelligence agencies is obviously a very serious matter. Before any item with military significance can be determined as nonstrategic, certainly some intelligence office of the Military Establishment should be consulted to learn if the item is not superior to ones currently in use by or available to the Communists.

There have been prolonged discussions with our allies over NATO forces and strategy. Much of that strategy, I believe, hinges on the capability of the Communists to reinforce westward. Do any of our exports now contribute to a buildup of that capability?

Can the administration assure us that the commodities and technology which the Communists are obtaining from us are not useful to the Communists in their ballistic-missile and anti-ballistic-missile programs? For example, are we not providing items which are useful to harden Soviet missile sites or to otherwise improve their forces?

Clearly the administration leaders should not fail to see the close relationship between the Communist military potential and the commodities and technology which is being sent from America to the Communists. U.S. intelligence organizations cost millions of dollars and they can provide millions of dollars worth of expert technical advice. Why are the U.S. intelligence organizations not being properly used in making determinations about controls on trade?

Many other serious, far-reaching questions arise due to administration failure and action in the area of export control.

Can anyone doubt, for example, that computers do make a significant contribution to the military and economic potential of a nation? In 1966 on numerous instances Communist nations, including the regimes of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union have been granted licenses to buy computers and computer components and computer replacement parts.

Incidentally, France, in at least seven instances in 1966, was denied shipment of such items ranging in value from \$35,000 to over \$5 million. According to news stories, in November 1966, a license finally was granted to ship one large size computer to France. Is it possible that Communist countries have been authorized to obtain our technology while at the same time computer technology has been denied to more friendly countries? If so, could this account in part for the estrangement which has developed between ourselves and France?

Rhodesia is a small place inhabited by less than 5 million people. Americans do not necessarily agree with the policies that govern the Rhodesians. But Americans do not necessarily believe that the rulers of Rhodesia are more despicable than the Communists who directly control over 200 million Soviet citizens; Communists, who, in the wording of the Baltic States resolution which was approved by the 89th Congress have "forcibly deprived" fundamental human rights to people who live in that Communist society. And it is the Communist governments of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe who are supplying the weapons which are killing Americans and our allies in southeast Asia. It is not the Rhodesians.

And yet this administration promotes and propagandizes Americans to sell goods to the Communists while it denies many of the same goods to the people of Rhodesia because this administration has determined that those goods would "constitute a significant contribution to the Southern Rhodesian economy."

The administration endorses and carries out trade sanctions against Rhodesia fully cooperating with the desires of Britain. But why is this cooperation not reciprocated in the case of trade with Cuba? The United States instituted an embargo on all commerce with Cuba from the standpoint of its significance to the security of our country. But Britain goes its merry way with Cuba. In 1964 and 1965 the British Government's Board of Trade provided credits to Cuba in order that over \$25 million of automotive products could be shipped to Cuba. And, just within the last 2 weeks Britain again provided credit guarantees to Cuba in order to supply Cuba with a \$28 million fertilizer plant.

The possibility of militarily valuable American-made products going to China and North Vietnam via Hong Kong is of concern also.

Questions also are raised concerning the Aeroflot agreement which is a part of the administration's new overture to the Communists. The President on October 7 said:

We are negotiating a civil air agreement with the Soviet Union. This will facilitate tourism in both directions.

Twenty-four days later the Soviet civil airline, Aeroflot, was the means by which an American citizen was kidnapped and transported to Czechoslovakia for imprisonment and possibly worse. Administration authorities learned of this act almost immediately and were officially notified by the Czechoslovaks on November 3. That affair notwithstanding, on November 4 the administration went ahead and signed the civil air agreement with the Aeroflot officials. This spring we may expect additional tourist dollars to flow to the Communists via Aeroflot jets.

Fifteen years ago, when the Czechoslovaks imprisoned an American citizen, the U.S. Government within 6 weeks imposed a ban on travel by Americans to Czechoslovakia. And, within 14 weeks, we virtually ended all trade relations with Czechoslovakia until the American was released from prison. Today many

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Americans, even those who do not plan to go abroad on an Aeroflot aircraft, anxiously compare the procedures followed by this administration in the current case with the procedures used in 1951.

On November 29, 1966, the administration raised our diplomatic relations with Hungary to the ambassadorial level. The post in Budapest had been downgraded for good and sufficient reasons in 1956; a gesture which showed our distaste over the bloody suppression of the Hungarian peoples' fight for freedom. Has this administration now extracted some sort of policy concession from the Hungarian Communists? Or, did the administration grant a concession to the Hungarian Communists? Here is what Hungarian Premier Kallai reported to the Hungarians on November 30, 1966:

We have concluded an agreement with the United States to [raise diplomatic missions to embassy status] within the last day or two. I may say that even when the status of these diplomatic missions was raised it was not due to a change in our policy, it was they who were compelled to review their own policy.

The administration has announced it will seek action on the consular agreement with the Soviets even though, for example, it is known that most Soviet personnel in the United States have espionage or at least some intelligence gathering assignments.

The administration's determination to assist the Communists, through loans, to purchase free world machinery and technology, is another matter which has concerned many Americans. It will be recalled that one aspect of this subject was discussed and voted upon twice in the final week of the 89th Congress.

When the supplemental appropriations bill, 1967, came before the House on October 18, 1966, an additional \$600 million in the limitation on operating expenses was requested for the Export-Import Bank and it was pointed out that the Export-Import Bank had just initiated a new program of loans to commercial banks for export financing. No hearings had been held concerning what new programs were being set up by the Bank nor why the Bank was going into a higher level of lending activity.

It was generally recognized that the President's announcement several days earlier, on October 7, accounted for the new programs and lending activity. As I noted earlier, the President had signed a determination to allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credit to four Communist countries and also that the Export-Import Bank is prepared to finance exports for an automotive factory to be constructed in the Soviet Union by the Fiat Co. of Italy.

In the ensuing discussions those points were not refuted although it was brought out that the Soviet factory loan would be made to an Italian financial institution for the benefit of Fiat, the Italian firm which will build the Soviet automotive factory.

On October 18 the House approved a motion calling for an amendment to prohibit the Export-Import Bank from guaranteeing the credit of Communist nations for purchase of American goods.

However, 3 days later, on October 21, the House reversed itself by approving a watered-down version of the amendment after what some newspapers describe as "arm twisting" tactics by the administration.

Since this debate of October in the last Congress, I have obtained a news article printed in the official Communist newspaper Pravda which further clarifies the manner in which American tax dollars would be used to finance the Soviet factory via the Export-Import Bank. Here is a quotation from the Pravda story of August 6, 1966, titled "Agreement With Fiat Signed:"

Vittorio Valletta [Honorary President of Fiat] noted that his firm is furnishing the Soviet Union a total of \$300,000,000 in credits over a ten-year period. Many Italian firms will take part in the delivery of equipment for the [automotive] plant.

Apparently, therefore, the Export-Import Bank would lend the money to the Italian financial institution which would lend it to the Fiat firm in Italy. Fiat in turn will loan the money to the Soviet Government.

So it would seem that the Soviet Communist Party members learned of one aspect of this Fiat deal well before the American people and the Members of this House did.

I am convinced that should the loan be made to help equip the Fiat plant in the U.S.S.R., and should credits to other Communist nations be guaranteed, the administration will be playing a dangerously deceptive travesty on the American people.

Everyone knows that an automotive factory, for example, can turn out many products which are military or have a military potential. Yet the administration apparently has accepted the words of the Communists that the Communists only want to improve the well-being of the people who live under communism. Here is the rationale used by Alexander B. Trowbridge, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business, on November 2, 1966:

The President's decision to provide for Export-Import bank financing of American machine tools and other products for the Fiat automobile plant in the U.S.S.R. is a good example of how we will offer our cooperation on projects designed to improve the well-being of their people. We support their allocation of resources to expand consumer-oriented industries. We would rather see them create traffic jams with passenger automobiles than with tanks.

Administration spokesmen have not yet disclosed upon what they base their assurances that the Soviet Communists actually will not produce tanks or components for tanks. But if the administration wishes to believe the words of the Communists, indications are that Soviet citizens still have a long wait before they get the car they have been deprived of for so long. The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union in a foreign broadcast on December 7, 1966, reported:

The Soviet Union for the first time will deliver to the German Federal Republic a major consignment of Moskvich and Volga passenger cars. This was announced at a press conference in Moscow on 7 December in connection with the 10th anniversary of Avtoexport now sells cars to 60 countries. In

10 years the number of cars it sells has almost doubled, increasing from 35,000 to 63,000 cars sold last year. The export of automobiles will be increasing with a sharp increase in automobile manufacturing in the Soviet Union. In 1970, the Soviet Union will manufacture 1.5 million automobiles.

The selling or dumping of goods in other countries, even if in short supply and very much wanted by their own people, is, of course, a maneuver the Communist leaders engage in at any time they see fit to do so for political reasons.

On the subject of loans to Communists via third countries, Czechoslovak sources report that a joint Czechoslovak-Italian company was to begin functioning on January 1, 1967. A main task of this firm, which is called Sigma Italiana, and which is headquartered in Italy, will be to acquire technical knowledge from abroad. And there are new reports of additional Communist joint arrangements in Belgium and other places. American dollars should not be used to finance Communist economies via the subterfuge of Communist arrangements such as this in third countries.

So far as I have been able to determine, the President's October 7 address has not been published in any Communist publication, though a few commentaries did appear in Communist newspapers in mid-October. At that time all of the Communist policy planners, representing all of the Eastern European countries who are beneficiaries of the administration's "peaceful engagement," were meeting in Moscow to chart a unified strategy on world tasks. Pravda readers were informed that the U.S. President had renounced export controls and restrictions on commercial credits. But Pravda went on to say:

But Washington does not seem to understand that there is no basis for depicting these renunciations as a magnificent good deal.

One reported outcome of that Moscow meeting was the pledge of an additional \$1 billion in goods and cash to North Vietnam.

The very fact that the President's address appears not to have been brought to the attention of the Soviet people in any meaningful way is significant. The claim is that we are building bridges to the Communist people. But if they hear nothing about such actions from their rigidly controlled news media, how can bridges be built to them?

If the administration really wished to work for the exchange of ideas, one place it might begin would be with the use of the printed word. It is well known that the Communists do not permit any American non-Communist newspaper or publication to reach Soviet citizens. On October 31, 1966, in a letter, I asked the Secretary of State questions pertaining to such matters. Here, in part, is what the Department said in reply regarding the possibilities of a Soviet citizen subscribing to an American newspaper:

Such a subscription would be impossible as a result of the Soviet policy of restricting the flow of information into the USSR. In fact, it is highly unlikely that the average member of the CPSU [Communist Party

Soviet Union] could subscribe to a non-Communist foreign newspaper.

There are no restrictions on subscriptions by American citizens to *Pravda* or other Soviet newspapers.

However, this disparity springs from the difference between our open society and the closed society of the USSR and is not in any way susceptible to negotiations.

It is of interest to note that the reply states not only that such a subscription would be impossible because of restrictions on the flow of information into the Soviet Union but also that this is not in any way susceptible to negotiations. But why should negotiations not be possible? Such sterile thinking shows no apparent progress along these lines from where we were a third of a century ago when diplomatic relations were first established with the Bolshevik regime.

Have we proffered any such agreement to the Communists? It is high time for us to do so. And, if this administration is anxious to get ideas across to the citizens of the Communist world, all of our publishers and broadcasters of every political hue will be happy to tap that market which is so starving for ideas. It should be noted that a large number of people living in the countries understand English—it is widely taught in their schools. Moreover, Russian language editions of American publications can be provided.

Why could it not be required of the Communists that American newspapers, magazines, recordings, and television tapes flow along with the flow of American goods?

What rational explanation for this trade-with-Communists policy does the administration provide for the millions of Americans who wonder just what is going on? On November 23, 1966, Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman spoke on a nationwide television program. After admitting that an increase of our trade with a Communist regime would not make that regime a better one Ambassador at Large Harriman said:

A lot of bigoted, pigheaded people, who don't know what's going on in the world have prevented us from helping our balance of payments, you know, extending, our exports.

People who do know what is going on in the world do not look for the Communists to help us solve our balance-of-payments problems. Even a preparatory school boy should know that Communists trade policies are dominated by political motivations.

The operation and policies of the U.S. Government are properly the concern of all our people. The trade policies of America are not the province for a select few. The differences we have with Communists are not small, they are fundamental differences. The lives of American servicemen are not to be ignored for the sake of profits.

We soon will have to appropriate additional billions of American tax dollars to help defend this Nation against Communists. Just the money required to buy replacement attack aircraft for those destroyed this current fiscal year by weapons built by the Communists of the

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could be at least five times the dollar value of the entire export trade which the administration has been able to effect with the Communists in 1966. The lives lost cannot be replaced. Where does our sense of values lie?

Many questions must be answered before this House can discharge its responsibilities intelligently. Today I have asked only a few such questions.

Throughout this 90th Congress we must take every opportunity to exercise our constitutional responsibilities to question and, where necessary, to balance and to check on administration trade policies. To do so, the Members of the House must be correctly and fully informed.

The subject of trade with Communists concerns itself with many facets of many fields of interest. It cuts across the areas of interest and responsibilities of various existing committees under our present organizational set up; therefore, we do not have a body which can be responsible for, and equipped to study and to do justice to, the various problems which arise in the area of trade control. For this reason I have introduced a resolution, House Resolution 67, calling for the reestablishment of the House Select Committee on Export Control, such as was created in the 87th Congress.

Following is the full text of the resolution:

H. RES. 67

Resolved, That there is hereby created a select committee to be composed of five Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the committee shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

The committee is authorized and directed to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Export Control Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 7), as amended, with a view to assessing the accomplishments under that Act, determining whether improvements can be made in the administration, operation, or enforcement thereof, and improving congressional oversight and guidance over the formation of United States policies involved in such Act. In carrying out such investigation and study, the committee shall give particular attention to the following matters:

(1) The problems involved in the control of trade between the United States and foreign countries, particularly the foreign countries comprising the Sino-Soviet bloc.

(2) Methods and procedures followed in the formulation of policy under the Export Control Act with respect to the determination of how the export of articles, materials, supplies, and technical data shall be controlled, and the extent of such control.

(3) Procedures followed under such Act in obtaining information, advice, and opinions with respect to determinations of which articles, materials, supplies, and technical data shall be controlled under such Act, from departments and agencies of the United States which are concerned with aspects of our domestic or foreign policies and operations which have a bearing on exports.

(4) The extent to which decisions made and policies formulated under such Act concerning the control of exports adversely affect the security of the United States.

(5) The interrelationship between such Act and related Acts (such as the Mutual

Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, and the Trading With the Enemy Act) and other discussions or agreements entered into by the United States (such as the coordinating committee (COCOM) discussions and agreements) which affect or relate to the control of trade between the United States and foreign countries.

For the purpose of carrying out this resolution the committee or subcommittee is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places within the United States, including any territory, Commonwealth, or possession thereof, or elsewhere, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary; except that neither the committee nor any subcommittee thereof may sit while the House is meeting unless special leave to sit shall have been obtained from the House. Subpoenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any member of the committee designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member.

The committee shall report to the House as soon as practicable during the present Congress the results of its investigation and study, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. Any such report which is made when the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of the House.

I respectfully request full support by the House of Representatives for this resolution. The need for a Select Committee on Export Control is great. The committee is necessary if Congress is to carry out its responsibilities. I have requested hearings on House Resolution 67 and sincerely hope that action will be taken very soon.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker. Will the gentleman from California yield?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I rise to associate myself with the persuasive and compelling remarks of the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB].

Let me say at the outset that I have today introduced a companion resolution to that offered by the gentleman from California—House Resolution 67—calling for the reestablishment of a House Select Committee on Export Control.

The need for such a committee was never more clear than it is today in light of the Johnson administration's declared intention to substantially increase trade with Communist nations and especially in light of the Communist bloc's brazen and repeated admission of how extensive their logistic and weapons support is to Communist Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, the 90th Congress cannot afford to ignore the many ramifications of increased trade with Communist countries. It must certainly be obvious that trade with the Soviet Union and the eastern satellite countries is clearly more advantageous to communism's goals than to those of the United States or the free world.

Certainly, any student of past history knows that trade can at times be a more important weapon than bombing. Surely a strong case can be made for the

proposition that the use of trade today in our dealings especially with the Soviet Union and her satellites could conceivably have a more profound effect on the course of the Vietnam war than our reliance on limited bombing has had so far.

Can anyone doubt that the Soviet Union together with her Eastern European satellites is the chief supplier and therefore the chief "sustainer" of the Communist prosecution of the war in Vietnam?

Practically every American plane that has been shot down over North Vietnam has fallen victim to Soviet-made and Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft batteries; American planes have been tracked by Soviet radars; American ground forces have been subjected to substantial casualties caused by Soviet and East European military equipment; and the Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars have been supplied in the south by trucks made in these countries.

Mr. Speaker, approximately 80 percent of the weapons and strategic materials of war have been supplied to the Communists in Vietnam not by the Red Chinese but by the Soviet Union and her East European satellites.

Nor is Vietnam the only beneficiary of United States and free world trade with Communist countries. At long last, the President and the Secretary of Defense have admitted publicly what many of us in Congress have tried to elicit for 2 and 3 and 4 years; namely, that the Soviet Union has not quit the arms race either in offensive or defensive strategic weapon systems. An antiballistic missile system is being deployed in the Soviet Union today; work continues full pace on major offensive strategic systems.

And make no mistake about it. Trade with Communist countries aids them in these efforts and permits them to concentrate even more heavily on developing weapons of war.

Nonstrategic items supplied to the Soviet Union by the United States permits that Communist country to reallocate its manpower and resources to other pursuits. The simple process of producing toothbrushes is not as simple in the Soviet Union as it is in the United States. The cost to the Soviet Union of producing toothbrushes is at least three times the cost of producing the same items in our country.

Mr. Speaker, trade is truly a weapon and there are those of us who feel that the proper utilization of economic weapons such as trade in prosecuting the cold war could avert the eruption of hot wars such as that which is presently bogging us down in Vietnam.

Who can say whether the proper utilization of the economic tools of war 5 years ago and 4 years ago might have averted the necessity of sustained bombing in North Vietnam? At the same time, who can deny it?

Who would deny that if war must be waged, a naval quarantine of the principal ports that supply the enemy would in the long run reduce the casualties on both sides for the denial of logistics must necessarily reduce a nation's capacity to sustain the fighting.

Mr. Speaker, East-West trade conceivably might be a useful tool in our repeated attempts to bring peace to the world.

But let us, if we must use it, use it as a tool of peace and not as an expedient, one of whose byproducts is to permit the enemy to continue war.

If trade we must, let us use it intelligently in pursuit of peace by at the very least demanding and obtaining meaningful concessions that will bring the world a step closer to peace.

Let us demand of the Soviet Union and the Eastern satellites that the price of trade is a clear demonstration that peace not war is their intention. Certainly an acceptable demonstration of this intention would be elimination of their consistent role as the major supplier of the weapons of war to Communist North Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. LIPSCOMB], my able colleague and leader on the Defense Appropriations Committee, for bringing this most important and vital matter to the attention of the House.

I commend his remarks to all my colleagues and urge all Members to support his eminently sound request that a House Select Committee on Export Control be reestablished in this 90th Congress.

Mr. POFF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. POFF. Mr. Speaker, I rise to commend and to congratulate the distinguished gentleman from California. He is known to all of his colleagues as a most diligent scholar. On this particular subject he is particularly well informed; indeed, he is more knowledgeable than any other Member of either House.

The speech the gentleman has just made I regard as a signal contribution to the future welfare of this Nation. I commend this to the earnest study of every Member of both Houses.

Mr. Speaker, having known the gentleman from California since we were both first elected to Congress in 1952, I can assure the House that every statement he has made and every statistic he has cited has been carefully and fully documented.

America is safer because the gentleman from California sits in the House of Representatives.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I thank the gentleman from Virginia very much for his kind comments.

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. YOUNGER].

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, I too, want to join in congratulating the gentleman from California on bringing this matter to the attention of the House. To me there are two very vital subjects that are involved here. One is that the Constitution places in the hands of the Congress of the United States the control of international trade. I think we have failed in our duty in allowing the administration to take such control and have the ability, lawful or otherwise, to issue such a paper as they have issued.

Secondly, there is this question of

credibility. I think that stands out all through your paper. I am glad you brought it to our attention in this case, because certainly they have not carried out what should be expected of an intelligent administration in consulting all of their own people. If they had not consulted the Congress, there might have been some excuse for that, but intelligence is under their control. It is under the control of the President, and he has not even taken the trouble to consult with the important people who should be consulted before he ever issued such an order.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. MIZE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. MIZE. I want to commend the gentleman for the observations that he has just made. In the early part of December a group of us from the International Trade Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency went to Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union because we anticipated that the President was going to make this proposal to relax restrictions on trade with the East and we wanted to familiarize ourselves with some of the problems. We discussed this Fiat matter that you mentioned with Senator Valetta who is head of the Fiat company, and with members of the IMI, the Istituto Mobiliere Italiano. I pointed out to Senator Valetta that while there may appear to be certain advantages to the promotion of trade with the eastern European nations, many Americans consider such trade as trading with the enemy. While the President contends automobiles are a consumer goods item, and any production of consumer goods in the Soviet Union will reduce that amount of energy, manpower, and so forth that can be put into the production of military hardware, I pointed out that the industrial complex necessary to manufacture automobiles can certainly be used for other purposes. He very quickly replied, "If we do not buy these tools in the United States, we can get them from Italy, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and elsewhere."

Now, I merely point this out because if they do not get them from us, they will get them from our so-called friends. The plant is going to be built.

In that connection, of course, here we are being asked to support Great Britain in its squabble with Rhodesia, and she continues to trade with Cuba—but Great Britain is not doing a thing to help us in the conflict we have out in southeast Asia. They will be mighty happy to sell Fiat these machine tools and ship them over to the Soviet Union for them. Also, France, has been anything but cooperative in some respects lately—yet her machine tool builders would be happy to furnish these items.

This entire matter deserves thorough attention by the Congress.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I thank the gentleman, and I would like to add in my opinion the administration has lacked aggressiveness in getting our allies to rec-

ognize the threat occasioned by their sales to Eastern European countries and also to Cuba and North Vietnam. I believe it would be well if the Department of State with the support of the President would aggressively influence our allies to stop the sale of these strategic items which build up the economic and military capability of our potential enemies.

FREE KAZAN-KOMAREK

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PRICE of Illinois). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. MONAGAN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. MONAGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to draw attention to a situation involving one of my constituents. On October 31, 1966, an American citizen, Mr. Vladimir J. Kazan-Komarek, of Wellesley, Mass., was removed from a scheduled trip and arrested by Czechoslovak authorities in Prague. Mr. Kazan-Komarek was returning to the United States from a meeting he had been invited to attend in Moscow. The scheduled flight to Paris was diverted to Prague where he was removed by Czechoslovak security police. At the present time he is being held for possible trial on charges of crimes against Czechoslovak security, allegedly occurring in 1948 and 1951.

Mr. Kazan-Komarek, who was born in Opava, Czechoslovakia, has been an American citizen since the early 1950's. He has a family and successful business in Wellesley, Mass.

This impression of an American citizen harkens to the overt and illegal acts by the British of removing American seamen from legal ships for service in the British Navy following the American Revolution. The flaunting of the rights of an American citizen is not to be tolerated.

Mr. Speaker, I was amazed to read in the newspaper yesterday that authorities in Czechoslovakia were expressing resentment that the United States was trying to put pressure on that country to release from detention the well-known Vladimir Kazan-Komarek. It is incredible to me that this man should have been seized by the Czechs in the first place, but assuming the initial error, it is even more unbelievable that he should have been held incommunicado for 3 months instead of being promptly released. So I should say that our Government was being abnormally punctilious in the circumstances.

As the House knows, this is the case in which Kazan-Komarek, an American citizen of 17 years and a resident of Wellesley, Mass., was forcibly taken from a Soviet passenger plane by the Czech police in Prague on October 31, 1966, and has been held in a Czech prison ever since that time. Mr. Kazan-Komarek had been invited to Russia to attend a conference of intourist travel agents and was on his return trip home.

The Soviet plane on which he was riding was scheduled to fly nonstop to Paris but was diverted to Prague. The claim that the plane required repairs was obviously unfounded.

U.S. representatives have been permitted to visit Mr. Kazan-Komarek only twice and then for a brief space of time and under close surveillance.

It is undoubtedly true that the Czech-born Mr. Kazan-Komarek had been an antagonist of the present Czechoslovak regime and was actively engaged in supporting opposition to that regime in the 1950's. Even if these facts are admitted, however, they do not constitute a justification for this grievous international crime which flouts international law and constitutes a callous invasion of the rights of an individual. Beyond this, of course, it is a calculated insult to the United States of America whose citizen Kazan-Komarek is and whose obligation it is to defend the rights of its citizens.

This crime is as reprehensible as it is inexplicable. Since the death of Stalin and particularly in the last 5 years we have been given to understand that the countries of Eastern Europe sought closer ties with the United States and were desirous of regaining some Western orientation, both for commercial reasons and those of security. It is indeed difficult to see how the Czech treatment of Kazan-Komarek can further the cause of greater friendship between that country and the United States.

In recent years we have seen a deluge of projects and activities calculated to further the cause of Czechoslovakia in the United States. We have received visits from the great Czech Philharmonie; we have seen a volume of Czech-produced movies, including the famous "Shop on Main Street"; we have found in our newspapers glossy special sections stressing the touristic and mercantile assets of Czechoslovakia. So substantial did the maturing of the Communist government appear that President Johnson in his speech of October 7, 1966, recommended that the Congress take action to extend the most-favored-nation treatment to Eastern European countries.

We can recognize that there has been much progress in Czechoslovakia in the last 5 years. I can well remember the grim border at Bratislava in 1962 with its barbed wire and sentry boxes. Since that time, police state procedures have been lifted, there has been expanded travel and a broad scale overhaul of the whole economic system of that country has been carried through. Unfortunately, however, the Czech authorities do not seem to realize that so far as the United States is concerned, all this progress has been put in jeopardy because of its callous high-handedness in the case of Kazan-Komarek.

As a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs serving on the Subcommittee on Europe and having a special interest in the captive nations, I have followed developments in Eastern Europe with great interest. I have made several trips behind the Iron Curtain and helped to conduct the historic Foreign Affairs Committee hearings several years ago which studied current trends

in the Soviet Union. I have welcomed the liberating changes that have taken place in the Communist countries, but I can only view the case about which I speak as a deplorable and damaging step backward. Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries complain of the language which describes them as "captive nations." They maintain that they are free and sovereign and that their people enjoy individual liberty. However, the objective of those in the free world who have followed the fate of the countries of Eastern Europe after their takeover by the Communists has been to help secure the acceptance and recognition in those countries of the basic rights of the individual such as those which are guaranteed by the declaration of rights of the U.N. Charter and by the Constitution of the United States.

It is quite clear from the Kazan-Komarek case that the rights of a speedy trial, of freedom from arbitrary arrest and of adequate representation do not apply in the case. One wonders how many other unpublishized and similar cases there may be. It is chilling to see the iron hand suddenly thrust forth.

Mr. Speaker, the action of the Czech Government has set back the clock of progress many years. It has caused many who considered improved relations possible to have sober second thoughts about the extent of the change which has taken place behind the Iron Curtain. It is doubly tragic that a nation with the proud democratic tradition of Czechoslovakia should at this crucial time resort to arbitrary and brutal practices.

It is for this reason that I was surprised to read that Czech officials resented attempts by the U.S. Government to obtain action in the case of Kazan-Komarek. I would hope that the action of our Government would be even more forceful than it has been. I myself have communicated with Secretary Rusk about this matter and I know that he views this case with the greatest concern. He has guaranteed that it will be followed with great care and with the highest priority.

In my work as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and also as a delegate to meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union I have had occasion to meet many Czech legislators and diplomats and I believe that most of these officials are men of good will and generally seek to improve our relations. It is hard to believe that they would wish to throw a bombshell into the delicate structure which has been so painstakingly constructed, but such appears to be the case unless they are unable to act against the power of the police apparatus between the Communist states which worked so efficiently in this case.

I call upon our Secretary of State to renew the representations that have hitherto been made to bring the Czech Government to its senses. Certainly the United States cannot any longer remain quiescent in the face of this high-handed and illegal invasion of the rights of one of its citizens. The time to release Kazan-Komarek is now.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?